

A NOTE ON SCHOL. *AD PL. ION* 530A AND *REP.* 373B

ῥαψωδῆσαι λέγεται καὶ τὸ φλυαρῆσαι, ἣ τὸ ἀπλῶς †λαβεῖν (l. λαλεῖν) καὶ ἀπαγγεῖλαι χωρὶς †ἔργου τινός. This is how W. C. Greene (*Scholia Platonica*, Haverford, 1938) prints the last sentence of the Schol. *ad Ion* 530a ῥαψωδῶν, which is repeated (with small changes) *ad Rep.* 373b and in Photius, *Suda*, *Et. Magn.*, and *Lex. Bekk.* s.v. ῥαψωδοί. But while his alteration of λαβεῖν to λαλεῖν is correct and confirmed by *Et. Magn.*, his second *crux* and his note 'quid sibi velit χωρὶς ἔργου τινός frustra quaesiveris' are unnecessary. The scholiast had in mind Aristoteles' differentiation between the two possible modes of μίμησις, i.e. narrative and dramatic action (*Poet.* 1448a20–4 ἀπαγγέλλοντα vs. πράττοντας καὶ ἐνεργοῦντας, 1449b26–7 δρώντων καὶ οὐ δι' ἀπαγγελίας; cf. later, e.g., *Tract. Coisl.* 1, Diomed. *Ars Gramm.* 3 [GL 1.482.14–25]), and incorporated it into his definition of ῥαψωδεῖν.

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ARISTOTLE, *DE ANIMA* 428b18–25

ἡ αἴσθησις τῶν μὲν ἰδίων ἀληθὴς ἐστὶν ἢ ὅτι ὀλίγιστον ἔχουσα τὸ ψεῦδος. δεύτερον δὲ τοῦ συμβεβηκέναι ταῦτα <ἃ συμβέβηκε τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς>· καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἤδη ἐνδέχεται διαψεύδεσθαι· ὅτι μὲν γὰρ λευκόν, οὐ ψεύδεται, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο τὸ λευκόν ἢ ἄλλο τι, ψεύδεται. τρίτον δὲ τῶν κοινῶν καὶ ἐπομένων τοῖς συμβεβηκόσιν οἷς ὑπάρχει τὰ ἴδια (λέγω δ' οἷον κίνησις καὶ μέγεθος) [ἃ συμβέβηκε τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς]· περὶ ἃ μάλιστα ἤδη ἐστὶν ἀπατηθῆναι κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν.

So Ross, incorporating Bywater's transposition of ἃ συμβέβηκε τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς from 24 to 20. Thereby Aristotle distinguishes 'the three types of objects of perception: (1) the ἴδια αἰσθητά, colour, sound, etc. (ll. 18–19), (2) the objects to which these belong, but which are here described as being (in the order of our apprehension of them) contingent on the ἴδια αἰσθητά (ll. 19–22), and (3) the κοινὰ αἰσθητά, such as movement and size (ll. 22–25)'—D. Ross, *Aristotle De Anima* (Oxford, 1961), 6; see also 289.¹

Bywater's transposition finds support in the Arabic translation of Themistius' paraphrase of the *De Anima*. On 160.5–166.16 of the Arabic, as edited by Lyons,² we find a paraphrase of 428b2–429b31 'which is totally different from Themistius' Greek version [as printed in Heinze³] (Lyons, p. XIII⁴). Whatever the origin of this divergent version—a preliminary assessment suggests that it is an alternative paraphrase made by Themistius himself—for the Aristotelian passage in question it reads (my translation):

Perception either is in the sensibles peculiar to each of the senses—and for the most part this is true, and only a little of what happens in this case is falsehood—or it is in

¹ See also D. W. Hamlyn, *Aristotle's De Anima Books II and III* (Oxford, 1968), 56 and 134–5, and—most recently—S. Everson, *Aristotle on Perception* (Oxford, 1997), 190. Bywater suggested the transposition in his 'Aristotelia III', *JP* 17 (1888), 56–8.

² M. C. Lyons, *An Arabic Translation of Themistius, Commentary on Aristoteles, De Anima*, *Oriental Studies* 2 (Thetford, 1973). On the importance of the Arabic version see my 'Ad Themistium Arabum', *ICS* 11 (1986), 223–45, and 'Ad Themistium Arabum II', *ICS* 23 (1998; in press).

³ R. Heinze, *Themistii librorum de anima paraphrasis*, *Commentaria in Aristotelem graeca* 5.3 (Berlin, 1899).

⁴ See also R. B. Todd, *Themistius On Aristotle's On the Soul* (Ithaca, 1996), 184, n. 25.

the things *that are contingent on the peculiar sensibles*, i.e. the essences in which these sensibles exist—and here the falsehood is greater, e.g. that this white is the son of Diares [cf. 418a21] (for judgement as to the fact that it is white is not false, since it is one of the peculiar sensibles, but that⁵ it is the son of Diares or someone else admits of falsehood)—or it is in the common and general things in most of sensation, e.g. movement and magnitude—and here especially occur deception and falsehood regarding perception (160.19–161.8).

The italics mark the Arabic equivalent of *ἃ συμβέβηκε τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς* present in the translator's Vorlage where Bywater wished and absent from where he had excised the phrase. It is in the nature of paraphrase that part of Aristotle's text (e.g. *συμβεβηκέναι*) is omitted while part is expanded (e.g. the inclusion of the son of Diares; see the translation above).

Armed with the evidence of the Arabic, we now see that the text of Themistius in Heinze seems also to reflect Bywater's transposition, especially if we follow Todd and delete *καὶ* after *τοῖς ἰδίοις*:⁶

... ἡ αἴσθησις τῶν μὲν ἰδίων ἀληθὴς ἐστὶν ἢ ὅτι ὀλίγιστον ἔχουσα τὸ ψεῦδος, δεύτερον δὲ τῶν ὑποκειμένων τοῖς ἰδίοις [καὶ] οἷς ἐκεῖνα συμβέβηκε, καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἤδη ἐνδέχεται διαψεῦδεσθαι (ὅτι μὲν γὰρ λευκὸν τὸ προσίόν, ὁρθῶς καὶ κρίνει καὶ ἀποφαίνεται, ὅτι δὲ Σωκράτης ὁ προσίων, διαμαρτάνει), τρίτον δὲ τῶν κοινῶν καὶ τοῖς ἰδίοις συναπτομένων, λέγω δὲ οἷον κινήσεως καὶ μεγέθους καὶ ἀριθμοῦ καὶ σχήματος.⁷ περὶ ἃ μάλιστα ἐστὶν ἀπατηθῆναι κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν, ὅταν τὸ πλείονων ἔργον μᾶλλον αὐτῶν ἐπιτρέπωμεν.
(93.9–16)

There is no allusion to the phrase *ἃ συμβέβηκε τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς* before *περὶ ἃ κτλ.*, and so no reason to assume that it stood there in Themistius' text of Aristotle. Todd translates *τῶν ὑποκειμένων τοῖς ἰδίοις [καὶ] οἷς ἐκεῖνα συμβέβηκε* as '[there is perception] of the substrates of the special objects, [the ones] to which those [substrates] are incidental' (116), and he notes that *ὑποκειμένων* here stands for *συμβεβηκότων* (185, n. 46). If he is right, and if his deletion of *καὶ* is accepted, then Themistius' words can be taken as a paraphrase of *τοῦ συμβεβηκέναι ταῦτα <ἃ συμβέβηκε τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς>*. Note also that Themistius' *συμβέβηκε* seems to have been lifted directly from Aristotle.⁸

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⁵ Read *ammā* instead of the ed.'s *immā* (161.5).

⁶ See Todd (n. 4), 185, n. 46. For his translation of the passage, see 116–7.

⁷ *Sic interpunxi: σχήματος περὶ* Heinze.

⁸ I am grateful to Professor Lyons for reading over a draft of this note and checking my translation of the Arabic presented above.

THE YEAR OF LIVIA'S BIRTH

The year of Livia's birth is nowhere explicitly recorded in any ancient sources, and can be determined only by calculating back from the date given in the sources for the year of her death. Both Tacitus and Dio place that death securely in A.D. 29. Tacitus limits himself to the observation that by then she had lived into extreme old age, *aetate extrema*, but Dio adds the more precise and useful information that at the time of her death